Abstract. Wireless network technologies offer ubiquitous broadband access to millions of users at an affordable cost. However, the broadband nature of the wireless medium make these networks vulnerable to a number of attacks. Malicious interference at the physical layer, and extended packet collisions at the medium access layer can cause significant DoS attacks. In this work, we show how off-the-shelf hardware can be used to create devastating DoS attacks in a IEEE 802.11 network. Moreover, we present two algorithms for attack detection that are based on the cumulative sum algorithm.
Introduction
Network proliferation has been remarkable, especially during the last decade. Technology advancements in the area of network communications have offered high performance improvement and ubiquitous Internet access. From the era of the early-stage communication protocols (e.g. Aloha) through the active networks [1], and software-defined networks [2] , ubiquitous network access has been achieved thanks to the advances in wireless technologies. A number of communication protocols (IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.16, etc.) enable energy efficient communications in relatively large distances. Thousands of smart phones and other wireless clients can now enjoy any-time any-where Internet connectivity.
Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium make wireless communications susceptible to a number of threats. Adversaries can cause severe Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) [3] by exploiting a number of vulnerabilities. DoS attacks pose a major threat in every communication system, often with catastrophic results as wireless communications are nowadays used in many applications (e.g. smart cards [4] ). At the physical layer, adversaries can generate malicious interference resulting in heavy packet loss in the network. At the medium access (MAC) layer, malicious users can create extended packet colissions, causing severe DoS attacks in the wireless network. Throughout this work we refer to adversaries and malicious users as jammers.
Our contribution focuses on showing how off-the-shelf equipment can be used to create DoS attacks at the physical, and medium access layers. We also present two algorithms for the detection of these attacks. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic components of our off-the-shelf jammer. Section 3 describes how malicious interference can be used to create DoS attacks. In Section 4 we demonstrate how extended packet colissions are easily caused by jammers, and how greedy behaviors affect network's performance. Section 5 presents two algorithms for attack detection based on the cumulative-sum algorith. Finally, conclusions appear in Section 6.
Off-the-Shelf Hardware for Malicious Purposes
As mentioned in the previous section, wireless networks, due to their broadcast nature, are susceptible to a number of threats. A major threat referred as physical-layer jamming refers to interference created by a malicious node. There is a number of commercial devices that can be used for this purpose (e.g. [5] [6] [7] ). Nevertheless, as we show in this paper, off-the-shelf hardware can be successfully used to launch severe DoS attacks in a wireless network.
Our jamming equipment is based on a mini-ITX board ( Fig. 1 ) carrying 512 MB of RAM with a 80 GB disk. The wireless interface cards are based on the Atheros 802.11a/b/g CM9-GP mini-PCI card. Furthermore, Ath5k [8] , an open source IEEE 802.11 driver is used, on Gentoo Linux. The software part of the jammer is shown in Fig. 2 . This consists of several components implemented in both the kernel and user spaces of the Linux operating system. At user-space, the command repository contains all the attack characteristics. These define a detailed adversary model to be used against a wireless network. Such a typical model can describe, for example, the wireless channel to be attacked, the attack intensity in terms of packet rate, transmission power, attack duration, etc. Commands are propagated through the netlink socket interface to kernel-space, stored in the command trace collection module
